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Now Let Us Make Europeans – 
Citizenship, Solidarity and Identity 
in a Multicultural Europe 
 
Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira​1 
 
Abstract: ​The euro crisis has hit “Europe” (the European Union, or EU) at its root.                             
Economic harshness, social unrest and political turmoil betray a deeper problem: a                       
weak pan-European sense of belonging — a common political identity thanks to                       
which European citizens may regard each other as equals, and therefore as                       
deserving of recognition, trust, and solidarity. This paper explores interculturalism                   
from an analogical perspective, looking at the harmonious interplay between                   
human rights and cultural plurality, as a possible source of trust and solidarity                         
among European citizens. Only a common — even if analogical — political identity,                         
whereby European citizens regard each other, if not as “siblings” at least as                         
“cousins,” can make the sacrifices required to overcome the crisis meaningful —                       
and therefore less unlikely to happen. 
Keywords: ​Analogical hermeneutics, interculturalism, human rights, solidarity,             
euro crisis, European citizens, political identity 
It is attributed to Massimo Taparelli, marquis of Azeglio, a painter, writer,                       
politician and patriot of the Risorgimento—Italy’s unification—and member of                 
the first Italian Parliament (1861), the famous sentence: “Italy has been made, now                         
we must make Italians.”2 At least a clear idea of what Italy was, existed: a unified                               
nation with the regime of a constitutional monarchy. A century and a half                         
later another union (with continental pretence) strives for survival, though                   
nobody knows for certain what kind of regime it has, and there is little evidence                             
that an appetite for the creation of a demos exists, since it is made of                             
very different nations. This entity, in the words of Ivan Krastrev “the                       
most sophisticated political puzzle that history has known,”3 is the EU. And                       
as the second decade of the XXI century unfolds, the project faces its most                           
formidable challenges since its foundation. 
In what follows this paper will submit that the present crisis, with evident                         
economic manifestations, has deeper, political and cultural roots, which should                   
be considered seriously if the EU, which rightly must be regarded as a sui generis                             
polity, is to advance into the future keeping its rare mixture of unity and diversity,                             
of intergovernmentalism and mild federalism, of multinational colour and                 
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transnational cooperation, of distinctive regional idiosyncrasies and a weak but                   
real (or analogical) identity and solidarity. 
One citizenship, many citizens 
On Thursday May 31 2012 Thomas Steffen, a director general in the German                         
ministry of finance caused a stir in Brussels at a conference organised by                         
the European Commission. In response to the suggestion by Italy’s Prime Minister                       
Mario Monti, that Germany was been too slow to help indebted countries in the                           
eurozone, Steffen urged such countries to turn from “grasshoppers” who                   
enjoyed the summer spending a lot of money,” into “ants” who worked instead                         
during summer preparing for winter. “Maybe we should all become ants rather                       
than grasshoppers” he reportedly said.​4 
Phillippe Aghion, a French economist based at Harvard University, suggested for                     
the present crisis a different fable from the same author (Jean de La Fontaine):                           
that of the oak despising the bamboo’s flexibility, until a storm comes and the                           
first one breaks but the second survives. Steffen retorted that it was “not a                           
German oak”. He compared the “southern” (mainly Mediterranean) euro zone                   
countries with East Germany during the reunification process, where huge                   
amounts of money invested have still not had satisfactory results.​5 
Germany has, indeed, poured the equivalent of around 2 trillion US dollars into                         
its former East along more than 20 years, with only mixed results (great                         
disparities still prevail).​6 ​And in Berlin’s view larger disbursements on troubled                     
countries like Greece (Portugal, Spain, Italy) should come accompanied of                   
incentives for midsize companies, loosening of protections against firing for                   
workers, special economic zones, selling of state-owned enterprises, and even a                     
version of Germany’s dual system of training (in vocational schools, and hands-                       
on work at companies).​7 
Unthinkable as it was only a few months ago, by the middle of 2012 top EU                               
officials are sending alarm signals publicly that something had to be done soon to                           
fight the crisis. Olli Rehn, vice-president of the European Commission and                     
Commissioner for Economic and monetary affairs and the Euro, warned                   
that the single currency area could disintegrate without stronger                 
crisis-fighting mechanisms and tough fiscal discipline.​8 ​The collapse of the                   
euro could be catastrophic for the former euro zone, with first-year output losses                         
of nearly 9%; even Germany’s GDP could drop over 8% as exporters contended                         
with  the strength of a reborn D-mark.​9 
Even more disturbingly, Mario Draghi said that the European Central Bank (which                       
he heads) could not “fill the vacuum left by member states’ lack of action.”                           
European leaders, he added, had to decide whether to stand by the eurozone: “the                           
sooner the vision is clarified the better for the European Union”.​10 ​Bank                       
of Italy governor (and member of the ECB’s governing council) Ignazio Visco,                       
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pointed out that political inertia and bad economic decisions had put “the entire                         
European edifice” at risk and only a clear path to political union could save the                             
euro.​11 
What steps are needed to address this profound crisis? The first and most evident                           
one is a series of sensible economic measures. Suggestions abound. We will                       
mention a few to illustrate. But as we shall see later on, the economic aspect is                               
only an initial step of a much more complex solution. 
Αλληλεγγύη: Greek for solidarity 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman believes that with some                 
adjustments (looser monetary policy, tolerance to possible short-term increase in                   
inflation, open-ended lending to governments and banks) the crisis can be                     
averted.​12 ​It has become clear from the situations not only in Greece (which                         
owes euro area governments and institutions an equivalent of 3% of the zone’s                         
GDP)​13 ​but notably in Spain (the fourth largest economy after Germany, France and                         
Italy), that the present remedies are insufficient and more vigorous—and                   
above all more coordinated—action is required. 
Thus a recent “Recommendation” made by the Council of the EU underscores the                         
need for fiscal discipline, “growth-friendly expenditure,” the correction of                 
macroeconomic imbalances not only on the part of indebted member states but                       
also with participation from “surplus countries” (eminently Germany), as                 
well as financial integration, to ensure also “an adequate flow of credit to                         
the  real economy.”​14 
Several analysts suggested that, since the euro zone’s problem is not its debt size                           
but its fragmented structure, some sharing of the burden and some ceding of                         
sovereignty by all of the euro zone countries could tackle the difficulties                       
successfully. Compared with over 100% in the US, the eurozone public debt is less                           
than 90% of GDP.​15 ​Concretely, they propose to “fill in two holes in the                           
single currency’s original design.” First, to create a euro-zone, supranational                   
system of “supervision, recapitalisation, deposit insurance and regulation”               
for (at least the most important) banks. Second, to mutualise                   
eurozone governments, at least that above 60% of GDP for any particular                       
member country, to be paid over the next 25 years, therefore limited Eurobonds.​16 
Spain’s deepening recession, with “drowning banks and soaring borrowing                 
costs,” a situation which sends alarm signals to the eurozone’s third largest                       
economy, Italy—it might eventually catch up with France as well—has brought to                       
discussion the convenience of euro-zone countries collectively injecting funds                 
directly into Spain’s and eventually other countries’ banks.​17 ​Both the                   
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB have expressed favourable                   
views in the possibility, as Italian Prime Minister Monti has urged Germany to                         
“reconsider its opposition to having common defences in order to shield                     
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Italy and Spain from contagion.”​18 
The idea of a “banking union” was also presented formally by the                       
Commission, in order to break the vicious circle of weak banks and                       
indebted governments, lending to each other.​19 ​In a document on “actions for                       
stability, growth and jobs” the Commission details more measures to tackle the                       
economic crisis, among which are the reinforcement of the Stability and Growth                       
Pact and the financial backstops (for instance the European Stability Mechanism                     
in force as of the 1​st ​July 2012), a stronger banking sector, a deepening of economic                               
and monetary union, improvements to the EU patent and the Services                     
Directive initiatives to liberalise internal markets and increase trade, empowering                   
further the European Investment Bank, and others.​20 ​But economic solutions                   
require political agreements. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has been blamed for the fate of many a Greek, and for                             
austerity and unemployment in battered countries across Europe, she has                   
been caricatured as a fearless, steely Prussian,​21 ​even as a Nazi,​22 ​labelled as                         
inflexible and stubborn.​23 ​On closer inspection, however, the most important                   
political leader of the EU is deeply concerned that “more Europe” from the                         
economic point of view (fiscal and banking integration), implies more sacrifices                     
from European citizens. Neither member state nor European authorities can                   
just assume that their citizens are happy to undertake those sacrifices. The                       
“democratic deficit” that had long worried the architects of integration (and                     
some scholars) in times where “output legitimacy” sufficed for                 
European citizens not to bother asking much, has become acute and must be                         
addressed. 
Ms Merkel is certainly a different kind of leader. Her natural sciences background                         
certainly makes her cautious. She finds herself in an unsought position whereby                       
she has to fight the economic crisis in Europe, please her Christian                       
Democratic (CDU) party, and pay attention to the desires of Germans, for whom                         
she continues to be incredibly popular (with 50% of her compatriots wanting her                         
as  Chancellor,  even  in  the  face  of  declining  preferences  for  the CDU).​24 
On closer look, the most important political leader of the EU is deeply                         
concerned that “more Europe” from the economic point of view (fiscal and                       
banking integration), which implies more sacrifices from European citizens,                 
both in terms of resources and of “national” (state) sovereignty contributed to a                         
European, supra-member state level. Neither member state governments, nor                 
European authorities can just assume that their citizens—who are also                   
“European” (EU) citizens—are happy to undertake those sacrifices. The                 
“democratic deficit” that had long worried the elites architects of integration                     
(and some scholars) in times where “output legitimacy” sufficed for                   
European citizens not to bother asking much, has become acute in the most                         
difficult situation, and must be addressed. Or so Ms Merkel thinks. On a                         
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speech in Berlin, to mark the 20​th ​anniversary of the signing of the                         
Maastricht Treaty, which among other elements created the EU, European                   
citizenship, and laid the foundations for the euro, Merkel stressed that                     
political union had not been done. In her vision the presidencies of the Council                           
and of the Commission could be fused in one position, elected by popular vote                           
across Europe; the Commission would work as the executive branch, the                     
Council would become a second chamber (senate) of the Parliament, and the                       
European  Court  of  Justice  the highest judicial authority.​25 
According to her team’s vision, the “fiscal compact” to introduce budgetary                     
discipline is only a first step. The second step would consist of tax and spending                             
priorities harmonised by the Commission and all eurozone finance                 
ministers. Eurobonds could be accepted then. Because of the importance of these                       
changes, Ms Merkel wants to see the “dangerous disconnection between national                     
politics and national parliaments, and the European Parliament,” addressed, as                   
the only way in which the monetary union can survive.​26 ​In fact, her style of                             
leadership apart, she may have a point, a point especially and increasingly                       
important  for ordinary European citizens. 
Objections to more spending in order to promote growth, for instance,                     
require the acquiescence of those who have paid in taxes the euros about to be                             
spent. Since the beginning of the euro crisis 17 member state leaders have been                           
ejected from office.​27 ​With no way to influence Brussels directly, European                     
citizens have voted against incumbents nationally, and shifted preferences                 
to fringe and sometimes radical parties. The European Parliament has, if                     
anything 
…widened the deficit it is meant to make up. It has increased its                         
powers with every EU treaty, including the fiscal compact; but it has                       
seen no parallel growth in its legitimacy. In the commission and in                       
national capitals alike, frustration with the parliament has been                 
growing. It is almost always in favour of more spending.​28 
At every election the turnout across (from just above 60% in 1979) the                         
continent has plumbed (to under 45% in 2009). Fringe parties, which have                       
been doing well in member state elections, do even better in votes for Strasbourg.​29                           
An alternative could be in greater participation of national parliaments at a                       
European level. 
Ms Merkel wants to see the “dangerous disconnection between national politics                     
and national parliaments, and the European Parliament,” addressed, as the only                     
way in which the monetary union can survive.​30 ​In fact, her style of leadership                           
apart, she may have a point, a point especially and increasingly important for                         
ordinary European citizens. Since the beginning of the euro crisis 17 member                       
state leaders have been ejected from office.​31 ​With no way to influence                       
Brussels directly, European citizens have voted against incumbents               
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nationally, and shifted preferences to fringe and sometimes radical parties. At                     
every election for the European Parliament the turnout across the continent has                       
plumbed (from just above 60% in 1979 to under 45% in 2009). Fringe parties, which                             
have doing well in member state elections, do even better in votes for                         
Strasbourg.​32 ​An alternative could be in greater participation of national                   
parliaments at a European level. 
Elsewhere I have tried to address the problem of political integration suggesting                       
that Europe does not have a demos, rather demoi, and that an analogical polity is                             
not only a feasible—if hybrid and complex—solution, but also more desirable due                       
to the specificity of Europe, its rich multi-national diversity, and the wish—or                       
tolerance—of Europeans to only a certain degree of integration.​33 ​This has been                       
characteristic of the European project right from  the start.​34 
Yet what can be the ground for such hybrid, or “analogical” integration? If it is                             
true that political union can create some common identity, it is also true that at                             
least some cultural affinity predisposes and enables the existence of a polity.​35                       
However the source of political unity, the common identity requires a weaker,                       
analogical character, whereby European citizens can relate to each other with                     
some level of closeness, even though much less than the closeness that exists                         
between compatriots.​36 
One condition for the emergence of a common political identity is an open an                           
inclusive public sphere that allows European citizens to discuss and participate in                       
the construction and life of the polity, allowing for their cultural differences to be                           
taken into account inasmuch as possible.​37 ​Yet an open space that excludes no one                           
is still not enough. Beyond pure tolerance, it involves recognition, interrelation                     
and intercultural exchange. Let us investigate this further. 
The source of solidarity: political identity 
The fabled controversy about ants and grasshoppers, oaks and bamboos, which                     
occurred recently not in the kindergarten of a remote European town, but among                         
high ranking officials and scholars at the headquarters of the European Union in                         
Brussels, is very telling. The crisis, Anton La Guardia remarks, “has confirmed                       
countries in their prejudices.”​38 ​He continues: 
Germans see Greeks as indolent and corrupt; do they really want to commit the                           
German checkbook to Greece fully and indefinitely? And having portrayed Angela                     
Merkel and Wolfgang Schaube as the embodiment of the old Nazi invader, are                         
Greeks ready to be forever bound to German strictures?​39 
Sharing burdens and giving up more sovereignty, even if in a controlled,                       
limited way, requires the implementation of greater integration. But both,                   
economic and political integration imply a sense of solidarity, of common                     
political (“European”) identity that justifies at least moderate sacrifices being                   
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made for each other. Michael Burda considers that “The limit of German                       
brotherhood extended to East Germany,” and Germans “saw what happened                   
with two trillion euros over the past 20 years. And these are people they love. They                               
don’t consider the Greeks their brothers.”​40 
Yet clichés are not patented to Greeks and Germans alone. Europe is a region of                             
the world in which many national groups have defined themselves, for                     
centuries, at least partially in reference to “the other” next door who is not “like                             
us”. Unfortunately (or, if it brings them consolation, fortunately) clichés are not                       
patented to Greeks and Germans alone. Europe is a region of the world in which                             
many national groups have defined themselves, for centuries, in part                   
in reference to “the other” next door who is not “like us”. It happens                           
between Croatians and Slovenians, between Poles and Germans,​41 ​between                 
Lithuanians and Poles, between Swedish and Fins, between Slovaks and Czechs,                     
between Spaniards and Portuguese,… It is not even necessary to leave a member                         
state to find prejudices about “others,” one just have to think of the differences                           
between Bavarians and Prussians in Germany, between Walloons and Flemish in                     
Belgium, between Andalusians and Gallicians in Spain, between Sardinians and                   
Friulians in Italy, and so forth. 
However the reality is more complex. Europeans do find some similarities with                       
each other when they are abroad, say in Africa or Asia. For all their differences,                             
they usually like to think of themselves as not the same as (even if often in                               
sympathy with) Americans. When they work at supra-state institutions (e.g. the                     
EU, or the Council of Europe), participate in student mobility programs like                       
Erasums, or express conceptions of culture and life-style (ideas about, and                     
attitudes towards food, history, the economy, the state), they find themselves less                       
far from each other than they thought they were. Using Mr Burda’s image above,                           
they may not perceive themselves as siblings, but perhaps as “cousins” or “distant                         
relatives,” someone they know either because they have done business together,                     
because geography has made them visit each other often, or even because they                         
have fought wars against each other several times along the centuries. 
One very concrete part of European culture with which few EU citizens would                         
disagree is the importance of human rights as they are known today. Concrete                         
contemporary expressions of the concept are given by the European Convention of                       
Human Rights,​42 ​and more recently by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the                         
EU.​43 ​If solidarity (even a mitigated one because it is trans-statal across                       
Europe) is to operate from one member state to the other, from one region to the                               
next, from one European citizen to another, there has to be something they can                           
feel as possessing in common,​44 ​something that identifies them as part of                       
the same political community, even if such political community being                   
a collection of states, is not itself a state. A common identity that makes the other                               
27 member states (if we include the newest, Croatia), and especially the other 16                           
eurozone countries, see with concern the problems Greece is facing at least to a                           
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certain extent as their own.​45 
In a very interesting comparative analysis between the collapse of the Soviet                       
Union and the present predicament of the EU, Krastev expresses astonishment                     
before “the horrifying inability of the southern debt-ridden countries to ‘translate’                     
their concern into German,” and at the “growing failure of Germany to ‘translate                         
its proposed solutions into the local languages of most of the other member                         
states.” The problem is not, in his view, one of diverging interests, but rather of                             
“lack of empathy.”​46 
And empathy, that capacity to “enter” into not only what the other “feels” but also                             
what happens to her and the way she experiences it, certainly facilitates                       
solidarity. In order to understand the other in that way, with empathy, some                         
perceived commonalities help. Not comprehensive commonalities perhaps, but at                 
least those that permit solidarity at the level of a broad political community, as is                             
the case of the EU. Thus we can speak of (common) political identity as that                             
atmosphere that allows solidarity. 
In order to come to existence, political identity requires some material elements                       
that are substantive—for instance the familiar political culture of human                   
rights—and others that are formal—as is an open and inclusive public sphere,                       
that sets an atmosphere for dialogue. But it also requires active elements that                         
realise, build and renew the collective identity of the political community. One of                         
them is relationality, which operates through intercultural exchange. 
Identity, analogical hermeneutics, interculturalism 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the instant solution to the present economic                             
crisis in Europe is interculturalism. As has been shown above, the problems are                         
very specific and demand adequate (and urgent) action. Yet it is also clear that                           
economic solutions require political decisions, and in democratic polities—like                 
every single member state of the EU—those decisions require legitimacy—the                   
mandate or at least assent—of the citizens. But such assent becomes a difficult                         
issue because European citizens can hardly see themselves as part of the same                         
community, as “political siblings,” in the way in which they, arguably, see                       
compatriots in their own member state. 
Interculturalism starts from the idea that culture is an undeniable aspect of being                         
human, and therefore of human beings and human groups. Like                   
multiculturalism, it agrees that cultural differences should be acknowledged in                   
constitutional democracies, in order to ensure for culturally diverse individuals                   
and groups some respect and tolerance, and to avoid explicit or implicit                       
discrimination on the basis of those differences. But beyond multiculturalism,                   
interculturalism suggests another step: that of the cultural interaction and                   
exchange. Under a relational paradigm whereby I do not only respect the other but                           
actually converse with him, learn from him appreciate him in what he is— also                           
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in his culture, and expect a similar attitude in return, the barriers of strict                           
tolerance, which end up creating ghettos and even parallel societies, recede.​47 
One obstacle to this relational interaction is the absence of a common                       
language. Krastev’s image of Germans and Greeks not being able to “translate”                       
into the language of the other their views and needs as the crisis continues to                             
unfold and the EU is on the brink of collapse, is a powerful image. He was not, of                                   
course, speaking of literal translations from Greek to German and the other way                         
around—a considerable amount of the EU’s yearly budget is destined to pay for                         
translations to its 23 (soon 24) official languages. But what can constitute                       
that transcultural language that facilitates dialogue? 
Among others, Mauricio Beuchot has suggested that such common ground could                     
be constituted by the idea of human rights.​48 ​His main concern is the problem of                             
cultural plurality present in several Latin American countries, eminently in                   
Mexico, where still today a mainstream Western culture, mainly come from                     
Europe through Spain, must interact with many pre-Columbian indigenous                 
cultures which have survived into the XXI century.​49 ​The idea could be useful, a                           
fortiori, in Europe, cradle of the modern conception of human rights. 
They are a concept deeply enrooted in the culture of Europeans, a ground on                           
which everybody roughly agrees. Greeks may not be siblings to Germans, but                       
certainly they are a people who believes deeply, like Germans, in human rights—                         
even claims to be one of the springs of European (and then Western) civilisation.                           
They may be different, but not as different so as not to have certain similarities,                             
even if as “distant relatives,” in the European family. 
To conclude I must mention that interculturalism is always closely related to                       
education, because the attitudes and dispositions for intercultural exchange                 
require not only rationality on the part of the actors, but also certain virtues that                             
may not come naturally to everyone, the capacity to listen and learn from the                           
other for instance. Another aspect essential to interculturalism as the engine that                       
propels the construction of political identity is its capacity to harmonise unity and                         
diversity, which has been developed by Beuchot’s “analogical hermeneutics” to                   
suggest an analogical cultural pluralism, which again for lack of time I will have                           
to leave for another occasion. 
Interculturalism, together with other factors, can contribute to the “making of                     
Europeans,” with an identity that respects and cherishes national diversity, but                     
that provides too the minimum of unity necessary for the European polity to                         
survive. 
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